In this paper, we provide an equilibrium cooperative optimization solution to two-person cooperative games in which the payoffs or utility are non-transferable. In particular, a strategic scheme is designed to determine the cooperative weight for joint optimization leading to the equilibrium point on the Pareto optimal frontier. A cooperative optimization solution with a non-cooperative game theoretic foundation is obtained. It is significantly different from existing cooperative solutions like the Nash bargaining solution, the Kalai proportional bargaining solution the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.
Introduction
Reaching a cooperative solution in games with nontransferable payoffs constitutes one of the most difficult problems in game theory. Nash (1950) , Kalai (1977) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) presented bargaining solutions based on axioms or principles that one would like the cooperative solution to have. Advancing from the axiomatic approach, the Nash (1953) Program --which intended to bridge the gap between cooperative and non-cooperative approaches -proposed the adoption of non-cooperative game aspects in formulating a cooperative solution. For instance, by proposing non-cooperative games that specify the details of negotiation for terms of cooperation, the Nash program supplements the axiomatic approach with the possibility for players to seek their individual interests in the process of cooperation. The cooperative solution then could be understood as the outcome of a series of strategic problems facing individual players. In sum, the Nash program proposes a "non-cooperative game theoretic foundation" for a cooperative solution.
In this paper, we consider two-person cooperative games in which the payoffs or utility are non-transferable. The players agree to achieve group optimality with cooperative optimization. Since the Pareto frontier is generally not a singleton, players would have to decide on which point on the frontier they would choose. A strategic scheme is designed to determine the equilibrium point on the Pareto optimal frontier so that each player is doing the best given the other player is doing his best. Equilibrium payoff weights are obtained for cooperative optimization. The strategic equilibrium for cooperative optimization is a novel cooperative solution for two-person Non-transferrable utility games. It is significantly different from existing cooperative solutions like the Nash (1950) bargaining solution, the Kalai (1977) proportional bargaining solution the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic settings of a cooperative optimization game. An equilibrium cooperative optimization solution is derived in Section 3. Section 4 examines the properties of the solution and provides an illustrative example. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
Basic Settings of a Cooperative Optimization Game
Consider a two-player noncooperative game of complete information. Player } 2 , 1 {  i seeks to maximize his payoff function ) , ( For simplicity of exposition it is assumed that an agreed upon Nash equilibrium is adopted if there are more than one Nash equilibria. The outcome of the game is denoted as
. It is well known that in general noncooperative Nash equilibrium outcome are not Pareto efficient. In the absence of a Pareto efficient noncooperative Nash equilibrium, players have incentives to cooperate and coordinate their actions in such a way that a Pareto efficient outcome is achieved. Achieving group optimality is the starting point of almost all cooperative games. In a two-person cooperative game with non-transferable payoffs the Pareto optimal boundary can be obtained by solving the optimization problem (see Dockner and Jorgensen (1984) , Leitmann (1974) and Petrosyan (2005 and 2015) ):
with the weights 0
The optimization problem (2.2) can be specified alternatively as:
Along the Pareto optimality boundary, individual rationality must be maintained so that the players' cooperative payoffs cannot be below their noncooperative Nash equilibrium levels. Hence restrictions on the ranges of i  and j  must be identified to guarantee individual rationality. Consider the case when player j is allowed to secured at a payoff level 
where i  is the Lagrange multiplier.
We use ) (
to denote the solution to (2.5) where j û is player j 's payoff. Since individual rationality has to be satisfied so that the players' cooperative payoffs must not be less than their noncooperative Nash equilibrium levels. Therefore, player i 's most preferred position is 
Moreover, player i 's least preferred position is 
for individual rationality to hold. Now, consider the optimization problem
The optimization problem (2.8) is analogous to the Lagrange problem (2.5) when the level of
Since the Pareto frontier is generally not a singleton, players would have to decide on which point on the frontier they would choose through an agreement on the choice of
An Equilibrium Cooperative Optimization Solution
In this section we present a solution to the cooperative optimization game provided in Section 2. To do this the players first have to determine a commonly agreed weight i  in (2.8) for cooperative optimization. Since player i prefers to make an offer and expose himself to a potential loss if player j offers a
Hence player i would offer
and player j would offer
Note that from Theorem 3.1 player i 's solution weight
is the geometric mean of most preferred Lagrange multiplier and the least preferred. This cooperative solution is a novel solution for two-person Non-transferrable utility games and is significantly different from the cooperative solutions in Nash (1950), Kalai (1977) and Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) .
Finally, to make computation more simple, we invoke the result 
Properties of the Solution and an Illustrative Example
The equilibrium cooperative optimization solution derived in Section 3 satisfies the following properties which are assumed to have to be maintained in the traditional axiomatic approach.
(i) The condition of Pareto optimality --because it is impossible to increase the payoff of one player without decreasing the payoff of the other.
(ii) The condition of symmetry (in the sense that the labels of the players do not matter) --because switching the labels of the players leaves the cooperative game problem and its solution unchanged (see Roth (1979) ).
(iii) Independence of irrelevant alternatives other than the points of minimal expectations. This condition is the counterpart of the Nash (1950) Bargaining solution's property of independence of irrelevant alternatives, as proposed by Roth (1977) . It states that the solution of the problem does not change as the set of feasible outcomes is reduced, so long as the point of minimal expectations in the Pareto set remains unchanged and the point originally selected remains feasible. Along the Pareto frontier, the point ) , ( Solving the problem of maximizing (4.7) yields the players' cooperative optimization strategies 
Concluding Remarks
Reaching a cooperative solution in games with nontransferable payoffs constitutes one of the most difficult problems in game theory. In this paper, we provide a strategic equilibrium for cooperative optimization to two-person cooperative games in which the payoffs or utility are non-transferable. This equilibrium cooperative solution satisfies the axioms of (i) Pareto optimality, (ii) symmetry, (iii) independence of irrelevant alternatives other than the points of minimal expectations, and (iv) independence of affine transformation of the payoffs. Future research along this line of research is expected.
